Malaysia's position at the heart of Southeast Asia has made it a connector of sorts to all the region's thriving economies. However, proximity also meant that rebel movements in neighboring states sought refuge in Malaysia. For instance, the Free Aceh Movement maintained a foothold in Acehnese immigrant communities in Kedah, just across the Strait of Malacca, and later established a leadership cell in Kuala Lumpur.
Likewise, in the 1960s when former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos was persecuting the Moros of Mindanao, they found shelter and sympathy in neighboring Sabah. More recently, when the conflict in southern Thailand re-erupted in 2004, the shadowy insurgent movement found refuge by blending in with the people of the neighboring Malaysian state of Kelantan, who speak a virtually identical dialect and share a similarly proud royal heritage—their two sultanates having intermarried through the ages.
There is no question such situations are delicate for Kuala Lumpur. Kelantan, for instance, is governed by the Islamic Party PAS, and has a long history of opposition to the center, including a little known challenge in the courts that sought separation from the Malaysian Federation when it was formed in 1963.
It was hardly possible for Malaysian security agencies to ignore the presence of so many rebels in their midst. However, being mostly Muslim and Malay, it was politically impossible to ignore their plight.
At best, the Malaysian authorities managed the situation by ensuring that the rebels kept a low profile. At worst, they sometimes exploited the situation for domestic political gain, or to exert leverage on the neighbors when needed. The Malaysian Special Branch and External Intelligence Service has a long history of managing rebels in their midst that goes back to the Malayan Communist Party of the 1940s and '50s.
It's no wonder that none of its neighbors really trusted Malaysia for most of its history. This only started to change in the 1990s when Kuala Lumpur offered to facilitate peace talks between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Manila. A formal Malaysian facilitator was appointed and the talks gained credibility when they started to be held more openly and transparently.
In the final stages of the MILF's reconciliation with Manila, four states and four non-governmental organizations, including the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, supported an advisory panel called the International Contact Group. This gave the parties to the conflict more confidence in the process. A framework agreement to grant local autonomy under the Philippine constitution was signed in October last year and set the stage for a comprehensive solution to the conflict.
A similar outcome is hoped for in southern Thailand since Malaysia reached an agreement with Thailand to facilitate a dialogue process. In a confidential dialogue process facilitated by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue since 2006, the two sides could only agree that lasting peace in the Thai south depended on Malaysia buying into the solution. Bangkok has now boldly endorsed a role for Malaysia.
These achievements underscore the sea change in Malaysian foreign policy that has moved away from perpetually balancing border security with local political interests and also keeping the neighbors off-balance. Prime Minister Najib Razak has tried to frame this shift in conceptual terms, establishing a Global Movement of Moderates and signaling Malaysia's clear intention to pursue peaceful coexistence and conflict resolution as bedrock policies.
But there are lingering issues that will be hard to resolve. Last month, old wounds were dredged up when a small group of disgruntled Moros from Sulu invaded a coastal plantation on the east coast of Sabah to claim their ancestral land. The conflict is a relic of the colonial era when the Sultans of Sulu "leased" what used to be North Borneo to the British government for an annual sum of 5,300 Mexican gold pieces. When Malaysia was established in 1963 it seemed expedient for the Philippines to maintain this claim over Sabah, and the Malaysian government agreed to continue paying a token rent.
Sultan Jamalul Kiram III, now in his 70s and ailing, felt that his request to be consulted on the MILF agreement went unheard. That's when a group of his followers "invaded" Sabah to remind Malaysia of his claim. Clashes with Malaysian security forces have left dozens dead and raised fears that the Moros, especially the Tausug from the Sulu archipelago, will oppose the recently concluded framework agreement and even send more raiding parties over to Sabah.
Malaysia is trying very hard to be a good neighbor and promote peace and stability in the region, laying aside old fears and suspicions. This deserves wider support in the region. But as the trouble in Sulu suggests, the ghosts of conflicts past continue to haunt the present.
Mr. Vatikiotis is the Asia regional director of the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, which has supported dialogue in the Philippines and Thailand.
